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ABSTRACT 
Although the ~elative geog~aphic immobility associated 
with ma~~ied women--as the ~esult of family utility 
maximization--is a familia~ notion, its effect on the male-
female wage gap has not been examined empi~ically, pe~haps 
because of the unavailability of adequate data. Utilizing 
the 1980 Census, which fo~ the fi~st time identifies the 
locations of all ~espondents in met~opolitan a~eas, the 
p~esent study estimates the impact of sex-~elated immobility 
on the male-female wage gap. 
To the extent that wives have less ma~ket human capital 
than thei~ husbands, ma~~ied women may be fo~ced to optimize 
thei~ employment mainly in the local labo~ ma~ket, unlike 
thei~ husbands who a~e mo~e likely to optimize thei~ 
employment in the national labo~ ma~ket. If this is the 
case, then ma~~ied women·s wages will p~esumably be mo~e 
sensitive than those of men o~ single women to the size of 
the local labo~ ma~ket. 
The empi~ical findings f~om a 1/1000 sample f~om the 1980 
Census indicate that the positive impact of city size on 
ea~nings is in fact la~ge~ fo~ ma~~ied women than fo~ ma~~ied 
men; in othe~ wo~ds, the wage gap between ma~~ied men and 
iii 
women narrows as city size increases. Computations based on 
the regression results show that about 12 percent of the 
unexplained wage gap between married men and women may be 
accounted for by city size. However, the wage gap between 
single men and women does not seem to have a statistically 
significant relationship with city size. 
These results are consistent with the main implications of 
Mincer·s hypothesis of a locational tie associated with 
married women. But the results do not identify which of the 
following two mechanisms is primarily responsible for 
depressing the wages of tied individuals in small labor 
markets: overqualification (because of too little diversity 
and specialization in available jobs) or monopsony <too few 
employers to guarantee wage competition). Since tests for 
the overqualification hypothesis were inconclusive, the 
present study primarily examines the monopsony hypothesis, 
both theoretically and empirically. 
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GHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Gender and marital status are important determinants of 
~eographic mobility. To the extent that wives have less 
human capital investment and labor force attachment than 
their husbands, the family utility maximization process may 
place a locational constraint on married women~ To put it in 
-------Mincer's terms, wives are more likely to be tied stayers or 
tied movers. To what extent is the relative immobility of 
married women responsible for the widely observed male-female 
wage gap? Until recently this has been a difficult question 
to answer empirically, since detailed identification of 
individuals by geographic location in national micro-data 
samples has not been available. With the 1980 Census now 
identifying locations of all respondents residing in 
metropolitan areas, the impact of sex-related immobility on 
the male-female wage gap can be estimated, and the 
implications derived from the locational tie hypothesis can 
be more easily tested. 
The present study is essentially an attempt to explain the 
difference in the degree of geographic mobility between 
married men and women, and to examine its effects on the wage 
1 
gap between these two groups. The analysis is based on the 
premise that immobility affects married women more in small 
labor markets than in large ones. 
~
he earnings of women in a small labor market (i.e., a 
small city> may be affected by two factors: (a) the narrow 
range of occupational categories and the limited 
specialization within each occupation, which forces women to 
take odd jobs in which their qualifications cannot be fully 
utilized; and (b) the fact that, even if they find employment 
in their optimal job, the number of potential employers in 
that occupation may be too small to guarantee competitive 
wages.... 
---
In case <a>, women ' s wages may be suppressed by 
overqualification; in case <b>, their wages may be suppressed 
by the inelastic labor supply curve to the employer leading 
to monopsonistic wages. These two possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive. Women in a small city may suffer the 
-
consequences of either overqualification or monopsony, or 
both. Note, however, that the earnings of women in a large 
city are less likely to be affected by either condition. 
In sum, if married women (given their locational 
costraint> can optimize their earnings primarily in the local 
labor market, then the very size of the local market becomes 
a determinant of the wage gap between married men and women. 
For the wages of married women will be more sensitive to the 
size of the local market than the wages of married men. 
In fact, the results of the 1980 Census 1/1000 sample 
2 
worked out in this study indicate that the impact of city 
size on earnings is larger for women than for men. The wages 
of married males increase by 1.3 percent for each increment 
of a million in city size, while the wages of married females 
increase by 2.2 percent for the same increment in city size. 
When the census data are grouped into subsamples by 
occupation, the results show instructive differences. For 
instance, the results for segregated occupations reveal that 
there is a great difference between male segregated and 
female segregated occupations in the effect of city size on 
wages. While nurses <representing female segregated 
occupations) gain 3.7 percent in wages for each increment of 
one million in city size, engineers <probably the most 
comparable male segregated occupation> gain only 1.1 percent 
in wages for each increment of one million in city size. The 
findings for mixed occupations reveal that there is often an 
even greater difference between men and women in the 
sensitivity of wages to city size. The data for 
postsecondary teachers indicate that the wages of male 
professors do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with city size, but that the wages of female 
professors increase by 4.3 percent for each increment of a 
million in city size. There are of course exceptions to this 
rule. The main exception I could find is public school 
teachers. While male teachers gain 4 percent in wages per 
increase of one million in city size, female teachers gain 
3 
only 1.4 percent in wages for the same increment in city 
size. 
Since about one quarter of the U.S. population lives in 
cities with a population of under one million and another 
quarter in rural areas and towns with a population of under 
100,000, the aggregate effects of the locational tie on the 
earnings of married women is expected to be substantial. In 
fact, the calculations show that about 12 percent of the 
' otherwise unexplained wage gap between married men and women 
can be explained by city size. 
----------The findings are consistent with the locational tie theory 
of Mincer. But such findings are also consistent with two 
partly conflicting implications of that theory: the 
overqualification and monopsony hypotheses. If 
overqualification (as an indication of wasted human capital> 
is a major manifestation of the locational tie for married 
women, then one would expect that the rate of return to 
education for married women would increase with city size. 
However, the findings indicate that the rate of return to 
education for married women does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with city size. One cannot reject a 
hypothesis on the basis of statistically insignificant 
results. Such results, however, suggest that a thorough 
investigation of alternative arguments is in order. As one 
alternative, the present study pays special attention to the 
monopsony hypothesis, particularly in the context of sex-
4 
related geographic immobility. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the relevant 
literature, constructs a theoretical framework from these 
existing studies, and derives testable implications. Chapter 
3 derives monopsony models applicable to gender-specific 
differences in geographic mobility. Chapter 4 gives a 
detailed description of the 1980 Census data. Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7 discuss the empirical findings. The final chapter 
presents a summary of the empirical findings and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
The principle that division of labor allows 
specialization which in turn increases wealth noted as 
early as the time of Adam Smith -- applies to families no 
less than nations. The division of labor between husband and 
wife, which has been observed in all cultures throughout the 
history of mankind, is understood by economists to be the 
outcome of a rational process of family utility maximization. 
The increasing returns from specialization create a division 
of labor in the allocation of time and human capital 
investments between the husband and wife. 1 Even in the 
absence of differences in natural abilities and acquired 
training, the different roles men and women play in the 
process of child rearing would most likely result in the 
traditional sexual division of labor -- the wife's 
~ specialization in 
r_ ._.,.· v . 1 . 
the household sector and the husband ' s 
'\ 1• spec1a 1.zation in n t-' 
,_ l ....... 
the market sector. 
~ .. \-rJ..~ -:\ ~ ~ r 
The simple fact that a married working woman has to divide 
~ ~ her time between market work and household work has profound 
implications for her economic status. Human capital studies 
often link the household responsibilities of married women 
6 
with their disadvantages in the labor market (for example, 
Mincer and Polachek [1976, 19781, Mincer and Ofek [19821, 
Sandell and Shapiro [19781, Becker [1985]). The bottom line 
~l of these studies is that, because of their traditional role, 
~ 
' women in general invest less in job training in both quantity 
and quality. 
--------
A brief review of the human capital approach to 
the male-female wage gap is provided in the following 
section. 
2.1 Less Investment in On-the-job Training: 
Premarket Effects 
Mincer and Polachek [1974] noted that women, as the 
primary providers of household work, spend a shorter time in 
the labor force over their life cycle. Moreover, their labor 
force participation is often discontinuous. On the average, 
mainly due to their child rearing responsibilities, women 
spend more than ten years of their lives out of the labor 
force. The labor force intermittency of women has a two-fold 
effect on their earnings. It may depreciate their existing 
human capital stock outright (ex post effect>; and it may 
deter them from investing in their human capital in 
anticipation of having to leave the work force in the future 
<ex ante effect>. 2 The discontinuous labor force 
participation of women not only lowers their earnings 
directly, but also indirectly -- by leading women into low-
7 
skill occupations with low "atrophy" rates <Polachek [1979]). 
In a recent wor k , Becker [1985] adds another dimension to 
the on-the-job investment analysis by explicitly formulating 
the quality aspect of the investment. He proposes that even 
if a married woman participates in the labor force as long a s 
a man, her job investment may still be lower. 
If child care and other housework demand relatively large 
quantities of "energy" compared to leisure and other 
nonmarket uses of time by men, women with responsibilities 
for housework would have less energy available for the 
market than men would. (pp. 5 3 5) 
Married women <particularly those with young children), to 
the extent that they are primarily responsible for housework, 
may have less energy available to allocate to market 
activities. Holding other factors constant, therefore, their 
on-the-job investment may be suppressed in terms of intensity 
as well. And th i s relatively lower energy available for 
market wor k may force women to economize by seeking jobs and 
occupations that require less e x penditure of energy per hour, 
further suppressing the level of their on-the-job investment. 
2.2 Locational Constraints: More Premarket Effects 
We have just seen how the trad i tional role of a woman in 
the family may decrease her market productivity by lowering 
both the quantity and quality of her job investments. Mincer 
[1978] takes this a step further. He proposes that that the 
8 
~low market product;v;ty of marr;ed women may cause them to 
invest less in yet another form of human capital --
As a result, wives are more likely to be 
geographically "tied", locating where their husbands ' 
rather than their own. Mincer 
establishes an economic definition of family migration ties 
and predicts, among other things, how they affect the 
earnings of family members. 
Of course, the lower level of labor force participation, 
the lower expenditure of effort, and the locational tie are 
not separate problems. They are interrelated in many ways, 
reinforcing one another and producing a compound effect on 
women ' s market earnings. The detailed review of Mincer ' s 
work in the next section is provided as a point of departure 
for the present study. 
2.2.1 Family Migration Decision 
Mincer investigates the problem of labor migration in the 
context of family utility maximization. For simplicity, he 
implicitly assumes that utility is monotonically related to 
real income. Thus migration to a particular destination 
takes place when the net gain in family income from moving 
<return minus cost of moving) is positive. For husband - and -
Wife families, to give the most simple illustration, there 
9 
are two streams of personal returns, R~, and personal costs, 
c~, from migration: 
c .... Thus, net family gain from 
migration is, G~ = Gn + G ... , where G is net gain from 
migration and the subscripts f, h, and w denote family, 
husband, and wife respectively. 
The decision to migrate will be made only when G~ is 
positive. If Gn and G ... have the same sign or if one of them 
is zero, then there are no negative externalities imposed by 
the migration tie on either spouse. Thus the decision 
whether or not to migrate will be unaffected by marital 
status. But if Gn and G ... are non-zero and differ in sign, 
then there are two kinds of negative externalities that must 
be imposed on one of the spouses. 
(1) If G~ > 0, then one spouse will accompany the other 
despite his or her personal loss - Mincer terms this 
person a "tied mover". 
(2) If G~ < 0, then one spouse will be forced to remain in 
the original family location even though he or she can 
obtain a personal gain from moving - Mincer terms this 
person a "tied stayer". 
By definition, whether a move takes place or not, the 
personal loss incurred by the tied person must be smaller 
than the personal gain of his or her spouse. 
To get a rough idea of the prevalence of migration ties, 
suppose that 25 percent of unattached adults migrate over a 
10 
period of three years.~ If the signs of Gh and G_ are 
independent in probability, 6.25 percent of all families will 
migrate without producing tied movers; 56.25 percent of all 
families will stay without producing tied stayers; 37.5 
percent of all families will have either a tied stayer or a 
tied mover. The actual distribution of tied spouses among 
these movers and stayers is not the main focus of this study, 
for either form of tie creates negative externalities for the 
affected persons. 
Our immediate task is to analyze why migration ties, on 
the average, affect women more than men. Let us define the 
net monetary gain from moving for family when Gh > 0 and G_ < 
0 as: 
<2. 1 ) 
Similarly, the net monetary gain from moving for family when 
8n < 0 and G_ > 0 is: 
<2.2) 
where r = the rate of return to human capital 
a = the rate of appreciation in earnings at the 
destination 
d = the rate of depreciation in earnings at the 
destination 
1 1 
N = the expected number of remaining years in the labor 
force until retirement 
K = human capital stock prior to migration 
c = the direct costs of moving, including psychic 
costs. 
The relevant for the discussion are the cases in which a > 0 
and d > 0. Assuming a zero discount rate for simplicity, the 
first terms on the right-hand-side of equations (2.1> and 
(2.2) are the personal returns from migration in terms of the 
augmented earnings streams until retirement. The second 
terms in both equations represent the indirect costs of 
moving in terms of the foregone earnings of the spouse at the 
destination. The direct costs of moving can be regarded as 
the same for the family no matter who initiates the 
migration. 
If the term G~h is smaller than zero, then the husband is 
the tied stayer; if it is greater than zero, then the wife is 
the tied mover. Similarly, a negative sign of G~- implies 
that the wife will be the tied stayer; a positive sign 
implies that the husband will be the tied mover. For the 
husband to be the tied mover, the wife's personal gains from 
migration should be large enough to compensate for his loss 
in earnings and the direct cost of moving. 
It is obvious that the probability of a spouse being tied 
depends on the relative magnitude of his or her N~K~. If 
12 
NhKh > N_K_, then there is a higher probability of the 
occurrence of a tied wife than of a tied husband. In 
general, the wife ' s market oriented experience level <K> is 
less than her husband ' s. Moreover, the wife expects a 
shorter period of labor force participation <N> than her 
husband mainly due to her responsibilities in the home and 
child rearing. 4 This leads to the generalization that the 
probability of married women being either tied movers or tied 
stayers is greater than that of married men. To put it in 
formal terms, suppose a and d are random variables 
distributed with E<a> E<d> =jJ > 0. 
<2.3> E<G..-h>= r_/) (l<hNh - 1<-N-> - c 
= E<G..--> 
It follows that: 
(2.4) Prob<G..-h > 0) > Prob<G .. _ > O> 
Then 
> rj<KwN_ - KhNh) - c 
That is, the wife is more likely to become a tied mover than 
the husband. Similarly, 
<2.5) Prob<G .. h < 0) < Prob(G_._ < O> 
Which indicates that the wife is also more likely than her 
husband to become a tied stayer. 
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The concept of migration ties can be generalized by 
considering all possible destinations.a 
remains the same. 
The main implication 
Thus far we have established how family income 
maximization results in geographic constraints on the 
mobility of married women. In fact, several studies provide 
evidence that family migration increases the earnings of 
husbands but reduces the earnings of wives [Polachek and 
Horvath <1977), Sandell <1977), Gallaway <1969)]. 
2.3 Locational Tie and City Size 
To carry the argument of the "tied wife" to its extreme, 
husbands would tend to locate themselves in the geographic 
market of their highest possible earnings <appropriately 
adjusted for non-monetary factors). Their job searches span 
all areas in the entire market system. Wives, however, would 
tend to optimize their employment opportunities mainly in the 
local markets where their husbands' chosen jobs are located. 
For wives, therefore, the characteristics of local labor 
markets become a major determinant of earnings. In 
particular, the number and availability of competing 
potential employers in the local market may place an 
important constraint on the earnings of married women. The 
Penalty that the family migration tie imposes in terms of 
14 
wives · ea~nings will be g~eate~ fo~ wives living in smalle~ 
cities. Women in la~ge u~ban a~eas will suffe~ a lesse~ loss 
from the tie, fo~ a dive~se ~ange of employment oppo~tunities 
exists within the local labo~ ma~ket. They have a highe~ 
p~obability of being employed in thei~ optimal occupation 
since a la~ge labo~ ma~ket offe~s a la~ge ~ange of 
occupations and high deg~ee of job specialization within each 
occupational catego~y. In addition, women in la~ge city have 
many potential employe~s within thei~ occupations. 
But women in a small city may be penalized fa~ being tied 
staye~s o~ move~s in two ways: <a> because of the small ~ange 
of occupational catego~ies and the limited job specialzation 
within each occupation, they may have to choose an odd 
occupation in which thei~ full qualifications cannot be 
utilized; <b> even if they find employment in thei~ optimal 
occupation, the numbe~ of potential employe~s in the 
occupation may be too small to gua~antee competitive wages. 
In case (a), women ' s wages may be supp~essed by 
overqualification; in case (b), thei~ wages may be supp~essed 
by the inelastic labo~ supply cu~ve to the employe~ that 
result in monopsonistic conditions. 
Since the size of the local labo~ ma~ket dete~mines the 
degree of wage loss associated with the locational tie, we 
can predict the following decision ma k ing behavio~. When 
both spouses have high levels of human capital and labo~ 
force attachment, the couple may e x pect the potential income 
15 
loss from the locational tie in a small city to be too great 
and are more likely to locate in a large metropolitan area. 
The larger the difference in earning power between husband 
and wife, the less cost is incurred by the tied spouse in 
terms of foregone earnings and the more li kely it is that the 
couple will be willing to move to a small city. Therefore, 
one can expect that the husband-wife wage ratio will dec rease 
as city size increases. 
2.4 Market Effects 
Up to section 2.2 we have considered only premarket or the 
supply-side effects of the division of labor. Now we have to 
bring employers into the picture to see the full effects of 
women ' s traditional role on their earnings. For the reasons 
given in section 2.3, this should not ma k e significant 
difference for women in large labor market. However, women 
in small labor market may be at a disadvantage even in 
selling their human capital at its already depressed level. 
We must ask what kind of market conditions confront tied 
Women in small city. One possible process is hypothesized by 
Frank [1978J. He addresses the pligh t of tied women in small 
local labor mar ket. As reviewed in the next section, Fran k 
Presents overqualification as the main mechanism through 
Which the family migration tie suppresses the wages of 
16 
married women. 
2.4.1 Overqualification Theory 
In order to make the analysis consistent with the human 
capital framework, I made some modification to Frank's 
exposition of overqualification. Suppose that each worker 
possesses human capial whose production function is given by 
where S and E represent schooling and job experience and 
subscripts g and s denote general and specific kinds of 
investments respectively. This particular production 
function allows human capital investments in both schooling6 
and job experience to have general and specific components. 
General human capial is defined to be compensated at a 
rate determined in the national market. But specific human 
capital is compensated at a rate determined by individual 
employers. Since the return to specific investment 
fluctuates from one employer to another, it can be used to 
determine the degree of matching between the employer and 
employee. 
By definition, one is exactly qualified, if she is 
compensated fully for all her specific human capital; one is 
17 
overqualified, if she is less than fully compensated for her 
specific human capital. The excess qualifications of the 
overqualified person have no value to the employer in terms 
of productivity. Of course, the person's qualifications are 
not fairly compensated from the employee ' s point of view 
some of her qualifications are wasted. 
The level of overqualification is given by 
(2.7) z 
where r-•• and r_ are the potential maximum rate of return 
and the actual rate of return to specific human capital 
respectively. If Z = 0, the individual is exactly qualified 
for the position; if Z > 0, overqualified. 
In order to maximize one s wage, the individual should 
identify the job vacancy in which she can minimize her 
overqualification level. Let the minimum level of 
overqualification in a local market be: 
(2.8) 
Where r_• represents the maximum rate of return to specific 
human capital obtainable in the local market. 
Assuming that each local labor market has a distribution 
Of vacancies with different levels of r_, the illustration in 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the process described above. The 
18 
straight hash mark denotes the level of r**. 
FIGURE 2.1 
OVERQUALIFICATION LEVELS IN A LOCAL LABOR MARKET 
r.• z- r** 
I o _1 _______ ~ ______ ___ 2 _ _ _ _ _ z-
' I I I 
If z•, the m1n1mum overqualification level in a g1ven 
local market, is non-zero, the individual may consider other 
markets. Ma x imizing one ' s earnings globally implies that on e 
should move to a market that contains the employer offering 
her r.••. For a single individual, moving to a mar ket that 
offers zero overqualification is a relatively simple matter. 
But for married individuals complications may arise s1nce 
each spouse may find his or her zero overqualification level 
in a different market. A couple may try to locate where the 
combined level of Z of both spouses is minimized. However, 
considering every possible market for two individuals 
simultaneously may be extremely costly. Thus, given 
imperfect information and high cos t of search, the family may 
'opt to locate where the husband ' s overqualification level is 
zero: the wife will then minimize her own Z, taking the 
market as given. To the extent that human capital of 
19 
husbands greatly exceeds that of wives, this sequential 
optimization may closely approximate the results of 
simultaneous optimization. Under this scheme, the husband 
can achieve global op t imization -- jus t like his singl e 
counterpart. Thu s for a hus band, 
( 2 . 9) 
where N = the number of jobs in total market system 
n1 = the number of jobs in large ma r ket 
no = the numb er of jobs in small market 
For a wife, on the other hand, optimization ta k e s plac e 
only in a local market. The number of vacancies in the given 
market determines her optimal overqualification level, z-. 
To be more specific, 
(2.10) 
The number of vacancies in the local market is inversely 
related to z-, as also illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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FIGURE 2.2 
OVERQUALIFICATION LEVELS IN MARKETS OF UNEQUAL SIZE 
r.•• 
' I 
0 ---~ ---------: - ------------ ' ------------------
' I ' 
t t I 1 : l I ' ~ 0 -i--i --- - : --+ ------1---4 ----t--~---- :-- ·, -----
• I t I 
To conclude, the effect of overqualification is greater 
for individuals with more specific human capital. If the 
overqualification level is a factor in wage determination, 
then the penalty for a wife's being tied should be greater 
for women with h i gher levels of specific human capital. And 
for a given level of spec if ic human capital, the 
overqualification level of a tied person should be inversely 
related to the si z e of the local mar ket. 
2.4.2 Employer Monopsony 
Overqualification is one manifestation of the locational 
tie associated with married women in a small city. But there 
is another possibl e market condition that may negatively 
2 1 
affect women's ea~nings in small city-- the potential 
monopsony powe~ of employe~s. When the ove~all economy is 
conside~ed, the~e is little evidence that p~ivate firms in 
met~opolitan a~eas in the United States exe~t monopsony 
powe~. Wage s paid by these fi~ms do no seem to be affected 
by the concent~ation ~atio <Bunting [1962]), and the estimate 
of the ave~age elasticity of the labo~ supply cu~ve to the 
individual fi~m is sufficiently la~ge to ~eject the 
possibiltiy of the p~evalence of monopsony <Nelson [1973 ]). 
These obse~vations a~e in line with the ~elatively high labo~ 
mobility in the United States. But the gene~al f~amewo~k of 
such studies do not deal with the geog~aphic immobility 
specifically associated with ma~ried women. 
Despite evidence against monopsony in the economy as a 
whole, the~e a~e indications that monopsony may p~evail in 
the case of special occupational g~oups. Some studies, as we 
will see, have found that the ma~kets fo~ ~egiste~ed nu~ses 
in small towns and fo~ public school teache~s in la~ge 
consolidated school districts a~e monopsonistic to some 
extent. 
Link and Landon [1975] found a substantial influence of 
monopsony behavio~ on the wage level of ~egiste~ed nu~ses. 
Thei~ study is based on the fact that ove~ 70 pe~cent of the 
hospitals in the United States a~e the only ones in thei~ 
communities. With the limited geog~aphic mobility of nu~ses, 
labo~ supply of nu~ses such local hospitals face a~e likely 
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to be inelastic. Using national su~vey data collected f~om 
sixty-five U.S. cities <the la~gest fifty cities and fifteen 
small cities of 20,000 to 250,000 , in population), a sample 
of hospitals we~e d~awn f~om each city. The numbe~ of 
hospitals in each city ~anged f~om one to ten, and the usable 
sample included 3 17 hospitals. L ink and Landon ' s empi~ical 
results indi c ate that the concent~ation ~ate alone, (measu~ed 
by the natu~al loga~ithm of He~findahl index) can explain 15 
percent of the va~iation in nu~ses' salaries. Link and 
Landon also calculated that a doubling in the He~findahl 
index is associated with $400 less in annual sta~ting 
salaries for nu~ses with B.S. and othe~ degrees. This result 
is consistent with the prediction of the monopsony 
hypotheseis in the nursing sector and confirms ea~lier 
findings by Hurd [1973 ]. 
Another example of employe~ monopsony is provided by 
Landon and Bai~d [1971] in thei~ study of the wage level of 
public school teache~s. Since teaching is a skilled 
profession, whethe~ alte~native employment in the p~ofession 
is available o~ not dete~mines labo~ supply elasticities to 
any given employe~. If the~e a~e many competing school 
dist~ict s in a met ~opolitan a~ea, even the locally tied 
teachers can have a number of potential employers. Using 
1966-67 national cross-sectional data on 136 school districts 
Which had enrollment s of mo~e than 25,000, the authors 
empi~ically e x amined whethe~ the numbe~ of school dist~ict s 
in the county had an impact on the contractual salary of 
beginning teachers. The number of school districts was shown 
to be positively related to the salary level~ and the 
relation was highly statistically significant. The authors 
concluded that the more districts in a county~ the less 
monopsony power possessed by the district and the higher the 
salaries of beginning teachers. 
The two studies just reviewed provide convincing evidence 
of monopsony in the market for nurses and teachers. One 
should note that individuals in these two occupations have 
something in common; they are relatively highly skilled and 
predominantly female. Reinforced by the fact that their 
employment is limited to their narrowly defined occuapations, 
the locational tie may be the cause of the monopsonistic wage 
determination of these groups. 7 
If the problem of the locational tie affects most adult 
married women, then the monopsony problem may not be confined 
just to these two occupations. It may affect women in a 
Wider range of occupations, particularly those requiring 
specialized skills. Thus the logical next step is to explor e 
monopsony induced by the locational tie in a broader contex t. 
With this in mind~ the following chapter will model employer 
monopsony in more generally applicable ways. 
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Summary 
A causal relationship between the traditional sexual 
division of labor within the family and its economic 
consequences for women was presented. Perhaps the best way 
to summarize these connections is to illustrate it with a 
chart. Figure 2.3 presents the supply-side effects of the 
typical role of female in the family. 
FIGURE 2.3 
SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR 
of 
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Intensity per 
Market Hour 
Investment Tie 
Market 
Effects 
as shown in 
Fig. 2.4 
The traditional sexual division of labor between husband 
and wife makes women less attached to the market. A typical 
Working wife works fewer hours and with less expenditure of 
energy per hour (often by choosing less demanding jobs> in 
the market than her husband. The result is that women may 
have less market human capital compared to men of equal age 
and schooling. Becau se of the lower market investment of th e 
wife, the locational dec ision of a family is often dominated 
bY the husband ' s employment oppor tunity. Thus women ' s j ob 
searches may typically involve only the local labor market. 
Besides the supply- side effects outlined earlier, wome n in 
a small city may e x perienc e additional disadvantages induced 
by their locational ties when they enter the labor marke t : 
the overqualification problem and employer monopsony. These 
two poss ibilities are not mutually exclus ive. Any 
combination of them is possible as illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
~ F IGURE 2 . 4 
MARKET EFFECTS OF LOCATIONAL TIE: 
POSSIB E OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN IN A SMALL CITY 
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Outcome (a), where tied women suffer from neither 
overqualification nor monop s ony, is mos tly applicable to 
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in a large city. The implied wage level for outcome 
(a> is w VMF' = VMF'* = w* More likely outcomes for women 
in a small city are (b), <c>, and (d). 
levels for these three categories are: 
The implied wage 
for outcome (b), w < VMF' VMP• = w* (monopsony only>; 
for outcome (c), w VMP < VMP* = w* (overqualification 
only>; 
for outcome (d), w < VMP < VMP* = w* (both 
overqualification and monopsony>; 
where w = actual wage received 
w* = competitive wage in the optimally matching job 
VMP = the value of marginal product to the actual 
employer 
VMP*= the value of marginal product to the employer 
in the optimally matching job 
A monopsonistic model of wage determination explicitly 
dealing with women ' s locational ties should be developed. 
The following chapter will expand the standard monopsony 
model to explicitly incorporate women's locational ties. 
Three types of occupations--defined on the basis of gender 
mix and wage gap between the sexes--will be examined: 
segregated occupations, mixed discriminating occupations, and 
mixed non-discriminating occupations. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1 • Fo~ detailed discussions, see Polachek [1975, pp. 451-
470], Becke~ [1985, pp. S33-S58J. 
2. The second effect would lead to somewhat highe~ wage s 
ea~ly in life and lowe~ wages later on. At equilibrium the 
two effects are equal in terms of discounted values: higher 
wages ea~ly in life will exactly offset lower wages later on. 
In terms of current values , however, lower wage s in late life 
dominate. 
3. Between 1975- 78, about 25 percent of the men and women in 
thei~ twenties in the U.S. migrated between counties or 
between states [Ehrenberg and Smith (1982), p. 276]. Thus it 
is not excessive to say that the p~obability of migration of 
unattached adults is appro>: i matel y 25 percent. 
4. Howeve~, families may decide not to move together if the 
costs of maintaining two separate ~esidences in different 
geog~aphic areas is less than the expected losses associated 
from the family tie. The solution of "commuter marriage" is 
likely adopted more by professional couples with a high level 
of specialized skills when both spouses have a similar level 
of market productivity and labor force attachment. These 
families may find the indi~ect cost s of being together too 
costly to absorb. 
Suppose that each spouse has a set of possible locations 
offering different levels of personal economic opportunities. 
Let G•h and G-_ stand fo r maximum obtainable gains for 
husband and wife. Let o*h and D*- stand for destinations 
where G*h and G*- can be obatained. cD*h and n-_ will be the 
same only by coincidence. When they are not, nonzero 
externalities caused by migration ties will be imposed on the 
family. 
The externalties stemming from migration ties can be 
defined as the sum of the discrepancies between the actual 
and potential ma x imum gains of each spouse: 
Where Gh~ and G-• are the actual gains of husband and wife at 
Da. Therefore, the term in the first parentheses represent s 
the externalities at n~ imposed on the husband, the term in 
the second parenthes es, those imposed on the wife. 
When D*h and D*- are not the same, families can make the 
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decision on where to locate in two ways: (a) they can choose 
a location that minimizes T, the combined externalities 
stemming from the ties of the husband and wife; or <b> they 
can choose D-n or D*-· Option <a> is consistent with the 
maximization of the combined income of the family. If the 
couple follows this strategy, they will have to search for a 
pair of jobs in all possible locations simultaneously. The 
outcome of this search is likely to force both spouses to 
give up their personal optimum. Under option (b), however, 
only one spouse gives up his or her personal optimum. 
The personal cost of the migration ties increases with the 
value of T~Y~. To the extent that husbands as a group have 
higher values of TsYs than wives, choosing D*n will produce a 
result that is close to the minimization of T, the sum of the 
externalities caused by the migration ties of both spouses . 
6. Perhaps one can regard education up to high school as 
general human capital investment and postsecondary schooling 
as specific human capital investment. 
Since they are employed in the occupations for which they 
e trained, the overqualification problem may not be 
gnificant. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MONOPSONY THEORY 
Literally speaking, a labor monopsony exists when there is 
only one employer in a closed labor market. But more 
generally, monopsony is associated with an employer who faces 
a labor supply which is less than perfectly elastic. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the labor supply curve of 
married women to a firm in a small town (due to their 
relative geographic immobility> is likely to be inelastic 
compared to that of men. Thus one can argue that even if a 
married woman in a small town is lucky enough to be employed 
in her optimal occupation, or not to suffer a loss from 
overqualification, it does not necessarily mean that she will 
not incur a wage penalty due to her geographic immobility. 
3.1 Standard Monopsony Model 
A direct realtionship between the monopsonistic wage and 
the labor supply elasticity is derived from the theory of 
Profit maximization. Assuming for simplicity that labor is 
the only variable input, 
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<3.1> Max pf<x> - w<x>x 
where p = price of output 
x = units of labor hired 
w = wage 
The inverse supply function of labor, w(x), indicates the 
wage level at which workers are willing to offer the combined 
amount of x units of labor. The first - order condition is 
(3.2) [pf'(x)- w<x>J I w<x> = 1/e 
where e is the wage elasticity of the labor supply to the 
firm. Equation (3.2> tells us that the proportional excess 
of value of marginal product over wage is inversely related 
to the supply elasticity of labor. Thus the inverse of the 
supply elasticity to the firm measures its monopsonistic 
power. 
If workers are perfectly mobile, then e = oo regardless of 
the number of local employers. The wages of mobile workers 
are thus independent of local conditions. Such a situation 
is applicable to male workers regardless of marital status, 
since they are geographically more mobile. But for women, 
marital status is a critical determinant of geographical 
mobility. Therefore for married women, given their 
locational tie, the local market condition may become a 
determinant of wages. The number of employers in a local 
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market will directly affect the labor supply elasticities of 
married women, and thus their wages. The smaller the number 
of potential employers in a given occupation, the more 
inelastic will be the pro-rata labor supply curve to the 
employer. <The labor supply curve of individuals with 
narrowly specialized job skills will be even more sensitive 
to market size.) Thus equation (3.2) can be modified as: 
<3.3) w. = VMP. I (1 + 1 I e.> 
(3.4> w~ VMP~ I < 1 + 1 I e~ > 
where subscripts, sand 1 represent small and large markets 
respectively. The fact that e. < e1 implies that w. < w1 , 
assuming MP. = MP1 and p. = p 1 or VMP. = VMP1 . 
3.2 Monopsony Models by Occupational Categories 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, despite the lack of 
evidence of monopsony in economy as a whole, there is some 
evidence that it exists in specific occupational groups, most 
notably in the case of nurses and public school teachers. It 
may be that monopsony is more observable when special groups 
are considered, particularly when their members have 
relatively high levels of specialized skills. This is 
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because individuals in specialized occupations have fewe~ 
potential employe~s than those in low-skilled ones in any 
given local ma~ket. Of cou~se, the ~elative immobilitiy of 
ma~~ied women a~ising f~om the family mig~ation tie may 
fu~the~ ~einfo~ce monopsony. 
With the above conside~ations in mind, this chapte~ will 
extend the standa~d theo~y of monopsonistic wage 
dete~mination to inco~po~ate the gende~-specific labo~ supply 
elasticity to the fi~m. I shall develop monopsony models 
applicable to diffe~ent types of occupations: (a) the 
monopsonist fo~ seg~egated occupations, (b) the 
disc~iminating monopsonist fo~ mixed occupations, and <c> the 
non-disc~iminating monopsonist fo~ mixed occupations. This 
distinction allows us to p~edict the diffe~ential impact of 
monopsony on diffe~ent kinds of occupations. Each of the 
three monopsony models is p~esented in Table 3.1 and 
explained in the following sections. 
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Table 3.1 
THREE TYPES OF MONOP SON Y IN A SMALL LO CAL LABOR MAR KET 
Production 
Function VMP 
Ela s tic -
itie s Wages Comments 
Non-
f (X,..+ X,. ) VM P,..=VM P,. 
3.2.1 Segregated Occupations 
e,.. >e,.. 
e,.. >e,. 
male and fema l e 
wor kers are not 
substitutable 
male and female 
workers are 
substitutable 
w,..=w,.. for 
instituti onal 
reasons 
There are occupations in which the workers are almost 
exclusively of one gender group. 1 Across segregated 
occupations the VMPF is in general not equal to VMPM since 
the VMPs are specific to the occupations. Let us define a 
female segregated occupation as one in which the proportion 
of female workers exceeds, say, 90 percent and a male 
Segregated occupation as one in which the proportion of 
female workers is less than 10 percent. While some 
Occupations such as security guards, firefighters, engineers, 
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and models for men ' s clothing are segregated male 
occupations, others such as nurses, kindergarten teachers, 
and fashion models are female segregated occupations. 
Let the profit of the monopsonist, who hires employees in 
both types of segregated occuaptions, be: 
Thus the profit maximization condition is: 
The implication is that the ratio of the male to female wages 
is directly related to the elasticity of male labor supply 
and inversely related to elasticity of the female labor 
supply. If the sex differentials of supply elasticities are 
larger in a small city, the ratio of male to female wages 
should be larger. 
3.2.2 Discriminating Monopsonists for Mixed Occupations 
By a "discriminating monopsonist", we mean a profit 
maximizing employer who is in a position to pay different 
Wages to men and women in the same occupation. By a "mixed 
occupation", we mean an occupation in which VMPF = VMPM. In 
35 
other words, men and women are perfect substitutes in terms 
of productivity and skill; the production function is 
This case is analogous to Pigouvian 
third-degree price discrimination in the product market. The 
discriminating monopsonist can divide equally qualified 
workers into two independent groups by sex. If each group 
has a different elasticity of labor supply to the employer, 
the profit-maximizing behavior of the employer will result in 
a sexual wage differential. 
function is: 
For this case, the profit 
where XF and XM represent the number of workers of females 
and males. From the first-order conditions: 
Since VMPF VMPM by definition, 
If eF < eM, then the wage ratio of males to females will be 
greater than one. Hence, again, the smaller the size of the 
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labor market, the larger the wage differential between men 
and women. 
Non-Discriminating Monopsonists for Mixed Occupations 
In this model, the employer hires both men and women for 
given occupation and recognizes the different labor supply 
elasticties of each sex, just as discriminating monopsonist 
However, the non-discriminating monopsonist is 
to or cannot (for institutional reasons) pay 
wages to the two groups. the 
is: 
(3.11) 
The first-order conditions is: 
0 < t < 1 
t is the proportion of females employed. Although the 
of men and women are the same, w ' (t) < 0. Therefore, 
the wage level is negatively related to the proportion of 
Women in the occupation. 
37 
Monopsonistic Profits in the Long-Run 
The geographic immobility of labor is often regarded as a 
phenomenon. Since the employer monopsony model 
certain degree of labor immobility, it may appear 
that monopsonistic wage determination is not sustainable in 
the long-run. However, the geographic immobility of married 
women induced by locational ties may persist as long as they 
married, particularly to husbands who earn more than 
do. Thus the monopsonistic exploitation by employers 
married women face may continue to prevail even in the 
However, it is questionable whether the monopsonist can 
profits obtained in this way indefinitely. 
are underlying factors inherent in the market economy 
may prevent the monopsonistic firm from keeping its 
For example, if a firm enjoys monopsonistic 
then it may eventually have to face the threat of 
In order to prevent potential new entries, the 
firm will be driven to make appropriate adjustments that will 
reduce its economic profits in the long-run. To see how this 
the profit maximization condition for monopsonists 
from equation (3.2) is reproduced as: 
(3.13) pf'(>: ) = w <1 + 1/e) 
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which simply states that the VMP of an additional unit of 
labor should be equal to its marginal cost. The firm can 
impose entry barriers by reducing its profit level, either by 
making adjustments to p, the price of its products or to w, 
the wage it pays to its workers. A primary factor in 
determining which adjustment the firm will make is the nature 
of the product market. 
If the firm is a producer of local goods, then the price 
of these goods is determined within the local market. If the 
local market is small, the firm might lower the price of its 
product in order to prevent new entries • In this case, the 
.anopsonistic profits wrung from immobile employees are 
transferred to consumers. The immobile employees of the 
local goods producing monopsonist will receive wages lower 
than their VMP even in the long-run. 
If the monopsonist produces export goods, which are sold 
in a national market, then the price of the goods, assuming 
perfect competition in the product market, is determined in 
the national market. In this case, since the product's price 
cannot be adjusted to prevent new entries, the firm may have 
to adjust by raising the wages of its employees. Thus the 
Markers employed by a national goods producer, even if they 
remain immobile, may receive more than monopsonistic wages in 
the long-run. 
The discussion above showed how the monopsonist may reduce 
his supranormal profits by voluntary moves to block the entry 
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of new competito~s. Alte~natively, suppose the monopsonist 
fails to take the app~op~iate p~eventive action, and new 
competito~s do actually ente~ the ma~ket. In this instance, 
the competition will d~ive p~ices down (in the case of a 
local good>, o~ wages up, o~ both. 
result is mo~e o~ less the same. 
In any event the end 
Quite apa~t f~om these adjustments, howeve~, the~e a~e 
othe~ ma~ket fo~ces that may supp~ess the p~ofits of the 
.anopsonist. To be mo~e specific, as long as the monopsonist 
enjoys sup~ano~mal p~ofits, facto~ owne~s who a~e in a 
position to ba~gain will p~essu~e the fi~m to sha~e its 
profits. Landlo~ds, fo~ example, will demand highe~ ~ents. 
And such p~essu~es may continue until the monopsonist no 
Ionge~ enjoys economic p~ofits. 
To conclude, the special kind of monopsonistic 
•xploitation facing immobile ma~~ied women cannot be 
corrected by the ma~ket system even in the long-~un. Ma~ket 
farces may be able to d~ive the monopsonist's economic p~ofit 
to ze~o. But this will be done by ~edistributing 
~nopsonistic profits, not by correcting the monopsonistic 
•xploitation itself. For the geographic immobility 
associated with married women does not change even in the 
long-run, so long as their earning power is less than that of 
their husbands. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. Such sexual segregation may occur when the gender 
characteristics are themselves the direct determinant of 
productivity in certain occupations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DATA 
The main implication of the theoretical analysis is that 
the wages of married women will rise more rapidly than those 
of married men as the size of local labor market increases. 
Since the size of the local labor market plays such a pivotal 
role~ the critical information needed for this study is 
nation-wide identification of individuals by SMSA <Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area). The only microdata source 
which provides this information is the 1980 Public-Use 
Microdata Samples <PUMS>. It is the first time a census 
sample has reported the location of all respondents residing 
in SMSAs. <The 1970 PUMS provided this information only for 
the 125 SMSAs with a population of over 250,000.> Since the 
machine-readable data identifies the SMSA only by code, the 
population of each SMSA was obtained from printed census 
publications. 
In the 1980 PUMS, there are three independently drawn 
samples, each of which features a different geographic 
Scheme. 1 The only sample which identifies SMSAs is B Sample. 
Out of the total of 318 SMSAs, it identifies the 282 having a 
POpulation of 100,000 or more. SMSAs of less than 100,000 
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population were not coded in the B Sample in order to avoid 
possible disclosure of information about identifiable 
households and individuals. Also~ "due to confidentiality 
constraints, the information on income is given only up to 
$75~000. 
Since the samples provide data for all individuals living 
in sampled households, which are identified by serial number, 
one can create within-family data to examine the inter-family 
effects of personal variables. 
There are 53 files in B Sample: a 1 percent sample file 
for each state and the District of Columbia; a 1 percent 
sample file for all county groups in the nation crossing 
state lines; and a .1 percent sample file for the entire 
nation. The national one-in-one-thousand file was chosen 
since it contains an appropriate number of observations while 
being relatively easy to manage. In the unedited national 
file, there were 226,524 individuals from 94,254 households. 
My subsample included only individuals of working age 
(sixteen years of age or older and sixty five years of age or 
younger) with earned income, who worked at least one week 
during the previous year and at least one hour during the 
census week. Those serving in the military or living in 
group quarters were excluded. Also excluded were the 
residents of non-SMSA areas. After all these individuals 
Were deleted, there were 60,586 persons left in the 
SUbsample. Table 5.1 reports the means and standard 
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deviations of key variables. 
TABLE 4.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
<N = 60,586) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
WAGE 8.21 7.71 
AGE 39.37 12.26 
EDUCATION 12.85 3.04 
EXPERIENCE 20.52 13.05 
SEX (femal e=1) 0.44 0.50 
FERTILITY 2.01 1.80 
SMSA SIZE 2.25 2.55 
Note: 
WAGE = annual earned income/Cweeks worked*hours 
worked per week) 
EDUCATION = years of schooling completed 
EXPERIENCE = Age - Education - 6 
FERTILITY = the number of children ever born for 
female, 0 for male 
SMSA SIZE = SMSA population in millions 
44 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. See U.S. Bureau of Census <1983> for more details 
concerning the census in general and the PUMS in particular. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
"ALE-FEMALE WAGE GAPS AND THE SIZE OF THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET: 
ESTIMATION 
To test whether the geographic migration tie imposed on 
married women amplifies wage differentials between the sexes 
the following earnings function is used. 
( 5 • 1 > w = F 1 ( X , S , M , SM > 
where X represents a vector of personal human capital 
characteristics such as scooling and work experience. S is a 
dummy variable for sex <S = 1 if female and S = 0 if male> 
and M represents the size of the local labor market, measured 
by the SMSA size. In a way, the SMSA size can be regarded as 
a variable controlling for all location-specific amenities 
that are related to city size affecting men and women 
equally. S can be regarded as a control for sex differences 
independent of market size. It follows that the coefficient 
of SM, the interaction term of the sex variable and market 
size, will represent the net effect of SMSA size on women's 
Wages relative to men's wages. 
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~.1 Control Variables 
Following the convention of earning fuction estimation, 
standa~d human capital va~iables se~ve as cont~ol va~iables. 
These include schooling, expe~ience, experience squa~ed, etc. 
In accord with prior estimates of earnings functions, I 
expect years of schooling and years of work experience to be 
positively associated with earnings producing coefficients at 
order of magnitude roughly equal to market rates of return 
investment. In the absence of more direct data, 
fertility, the number of children eve~ born, is included to 
women ' s labor force participation intermittency 
and reduced duration. Following the findings of Mincer and 
Polachek <1974>, it is expected that the fertility variable 
is negatively associated with the earnings of women since it 
is directly related to years spent at home, out of the labor 
force. 
S.2 City Size 
The main explanatory variable is the city size variable. 
As indicated, by interacting the city size with the sex dummy 
Variable, the effect of city size on the wages of men and 
Women are separately measured. In accordance with previous 
investigations of the relationship between earnings and city 
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size [Clark, Kahn, and Ofek <1988>, Fuchs <1968)] I expect 
city size to have a positive impact on both male and female 
wage level due to cost of living, unionization, commuting 
costs, and compensation for other urban disamenities. Thus 
the coefficient of M may overestimate the impact of local 
labor market size on wage level. Fortunately though, this 
bias is likely to affect both sexes equally <through the 
coefficient of M>, and thus not critically affecting the 
coefficient of the interaction SM. 
5.3 Results 
The ordinary least-squares results of the earnings 
equations for married men and women are presented in Table 
5.1. In the linear specification with respect to city size 
(Column 1), the estimates indicate that the male wage level 
will increase by 1.3 percent for each increment of a million 
in city size. For females the wage level is expected to 
increase by 2.2 percent for the same increment of city size, 
and the difference <.022 - .013 = .009) is statistically 
significant at the level of .01 percent. The results 
indicate that a married female worker's penalty for being 
confined to a local labor market gets smaller as city size 
increases. This supports the hypothesis developed earlier: 
the negative impact of the geographic migration tie on 
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relative earnings of women is inversely related to city size. 
The result obtained from the quadratic specification 
(Column 2), too, is consistent with the hypothesis. The wage 
level, which increases with city size but at a decreasing 
rate, reaches its peak at a different city size for men and 
women. Male wages peak at a city size of 5 million and 
female wages at a city size of 9.5 million. 1 The fact that 
female wages peak at the largest city in the sample indicates 
that female wages, unlike those of males, increase with city 
size monotonically in the relevant range of the data. 
Table 5.2 shows the impact of labor market size on the 
wages of never married individuals. Like the married group, 
the wages of singles increase with city size at a rate of 1.6 
percent per million. However, contrary to the married group, 
the additional increment in wages for women is only .5 
percent and is not statistically significant. Since the F-
ratio obtained from the Chow test is 1.4 <the critical value 
is 1>, we can reject the hypothesis that the two groups have 
identical slopes. This result implies that, for women, 
marital status is a factor in determining the sensitivity of 
their wages to city size. This further supports the 
hypothesis of a migration tie associated with married women. 
For an additional test of the hypothesis, I also examine 
the husband-wife wage ratio using the paired sample of two-
earner couples. Within-family data, where the unit of 
observation is the family rather than an individual, is 
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created by pairing the individual data for married couples. 
such a sample controls for otherwise unobservable family-
specific variables, such as the length of marriage, the 
spacing of children, family wealth, patterns of division of 
labor between spouses, etc. 
to the sample. 
The following function is fitted 
(5.2) ln <w....,/w ... > = F 2 <X....,, X ... , M > 
where X...., and x ... denote the human capital variables of husband 
and wife respectively, and M stands for the SMSA size. The 
results in Table 5.3 indicate that the husband-wife wage 
ratio declines as the SMSA size becomes larger. For each 
increment of one million in the SMSA population, the ratio 
declines by 2 percent, thus narrowing the wage gap between 
husband and wife. This result further confirms that wives 
suffer economic penalties -- although they can be alleviated 
to some extent in large labor markets because of family 
migration tie5. Note that compared to the estimates obtained 
from the unpaired sample <Table 5.1>, the estimated response 
of the male-female relative wage to city size in the paired 
sample is roughly twice as sensitive <2 percent per million 
compared with .9 percent per million). The mere fact that 
the results differ is not particularly surprising, because 
the two samples differ in a systematic way. 2 <Recall that 
the paired sample is confined to two-earner couples.) But 
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it provides strong evidence of compensating substitution in 
earning power for two-earner families, as implied by Mincer's 
rules of optimal migration. That is, potential employers in 
small cities will have to "bribe" husbands -- by paying 
higher wages -- in order to compensate for the forseeable 
loss of employment opportunities for their working wives. 
From the results of the within-family data, one can also 
see that another factor may be operating. As noted in 
section 2.3, when both the husband and wife have high earning 
power, it is more costly to be locationally tied to a small 
city and more likely that they will locate in a large city. 
Such couples are likely to be overrepresented in the sample 
of two-earner couples compared to the sample of individuals, 
which may explain the relatively larger impact of city size 
on the sexual wage gap when within-family data are used. 
S.4 Potential Biases 
One source of potential bias is the sample selection 
problem. 3 The f ~ct that tied wives in a small city may 
become unemployed or drop out of the labor force altogether 
poses a question of select~vity bias. The potential decrease 
in their earnings, which - would contribute to widening the 
wage gap between men and women, should they remained 
employed, is not captured by this study. In other words, 
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those who may be the biggest losers from the family migration 
tie may be systematically excluded from the sample since they 
receive no wages and cannot be included in the estimation of 
earnings equations. Quite likely, this effect will lead to 
an underestimation of the net impact of city size on women's 
earnings. 
One way to examine the seriousness of the selectivity bias 
is to investigate whether the labor force participation rate 
of women is affected by city size. If women's labor force 
participation rate is lower in a small city than in a large 
city, then the bias is more likely to be serious. The result 
of a logistic regression obtained from the sample of women, 
presented in Table 5.4, indicates that there is no 
significant impact of city size on the labor force 
participation of women. The coefficient of SMSA size is both 
negligible in the magnitude and statistically insignificant 
at 5 percent level. Thus one can infer that the labor force 
participation is not systematically related to city size and 
that the sample selection bias is not a serious problem for 
the models in this study. 
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5.5 Male-Female Wage Gaps Explained by the City Size 
If married women·s wages, as our findings indicate, are 
more positively sensitive to SMSA size than those of married 
men, then one important implication can be derived: at least 
some of the income differential between married men and women 
can be explained by SMSA size. This allows us to quantify 
the proportion of the residual wage gap between the sexes 
attributable to city size. Since SMSA size affects the 
discrimination coefficient (@WAGE/@SEX : -.529 + .009SMSA in 
the linear specification; @WAGE/@SEX : -.493 - .003 SMSA + 
.005 SMSA2 in the quadratic specification>, transferring all 
individuals somehow into larger cities would automatically 
decrease the magnitude of the unexplained wage gap between 
the sexes. For example, from the quadratic specification the 
discrimination coefficient for New York City is -.385 <-.493 
- .005*92 - .03 3•9> while the discrimination coefficient of 
an average small town with a population, say, of 1,000 is 
about -.493. Thus, taking these figures at face value, if a 
Woman moves from a small town to New York City, her wage is 
likely to increase by 10.8 percent <.493 -.385) holding other 
factors constant. Now let us imagine for a moment that the 
Whole population of the United States moved to a city the 
Size of New York. The resulting change in the discrimination 
coefficient, after such an exodus took place can be 
Calculated using the actual distribution of the population.~ 
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The SMSA coefficient is used as a cross-sectional deflator 
for the disc~imination coefficient. The results of this 
calculation are tabulated in Table 5.5. The base for the 
calculation is set at a city size of 9 million, which is the 
population of New York. In 1980, 5.7 percent of the wage 
diffe~ential that is not explained by othe~ cont~ol va~iables 
would disappea~ if eve~yone moved to a city the size of New 
vo~k. Put diffe~ently, about 12 pe~cent (5.7/49.3) of the 
total residual wage gap between men and women can be 
explained by SMSA size.e 
The same technique is applied to the years of 1950, 1960, 
and 1970. The discrimination coefficient deflators have 
decreased each decade as urbanization has increased. But the 
magnitude of the change is minimal; during the pe~iod of 
1950-1980, the size of the deflator decreased from 6.43 to 
5.71 or by only .7 percent. This result is in line with the 
observation that the male-female wage gap has persisted with 
little change ave~ the decades, at least in the case of 
married women and men. 
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TABLE 5. l 
CITY SIZE AND WAGES: MARRIED INDIVIDUALS 
Dependent Variable: Ln Hourly Wage 
T-Statistics in parenthesis 
!N = 46,495) 
-------- -------- --- -- ------ ----- -- -- --- --- ------- ----------- --- -------- ----- -
(I) Linear (2) Quadratic 
----------------- ------------- -- ------------ ---------- --- --- ---- -- ----- --- -- -
.985 ( 62. I l .946 (58.5) 
.06 3 (67.8 ) . 062 ( 6 7 . 1) 
.025 ( 30 .9) .025 ( 30. 7) 
-. 0003 (-20.4 ) - .0003 ( -20. 4) 
- . 529 ( -75 . 0 ) -.49 3 ( - 52.9) 
- .009 ( -6. 3) -.0 09 ( -6. 2) 
. 0 13 (9. 9 ) . 071 ( 14. 8) 
* * * 
-.00 7 ( -1 2 .5 ) 
.009 ( 4. 2) -.0 33 ( -4. 3 ) 
* * * 
.005 (5. 7) 
.267 .270 
----------- --- --- ------ ---- -- -- ----------------------------- ------ ---- -
WAGE=annual income / (weeks wor ked•hours wor ked per wee k) 
EDU C=years of schooling completed 
EXP=age - EDU C- 6 
SEX=! for female , 0 for male 
FERT=number of ch i ldren ever born for female, 0 for male 
SMSA =S MSA population in ~illions 
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TABLE 5.2 
CITY SIZE AND WAGES: NEVER "ARRIED INDIVIDUALS 
Dependent Variable: Ln Hourly Wage 
T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
(N = 6,320) 
------------ ---- ---- ------------------ --- ------------------------------ -- ----
(1) Linear (2) Quadratic 
.65 6 ( 15. 6) . 610 ( 14. 1 ) 
.065 ( 25. 2) .064 ( 25. 1) 
.040 ( 19. 3) .040 ( 19.2) 
-.0006 ( -13.4) -.0007 ( -13. 3) 
-. 186 ( 8. 8) -. 1 7 1 (-6.2) 
-.0 04 ( -0.8) -.0 04 (-0.8) 
. 0 1 7 (5. 1) .070 (5 . 3) 
* * * 
-.006 ( -4.2) 
. 00 5 ( 1 . 0 ) -.012 (-. 7l 
* * * 
.002 ( 1 . 0) 
. 17 4 . 177 
----------- ------------------------------------------------------ -- --
WAGE=yearly earnings/(weeks worked•hours worked) 
EDUC=years of schooling completed 
EXP=age-EDUC - 6 
SEX=1 for female, 0 for •ale 
FERT=number of children ever born for female, 0 for male 
SMSA=SMSA population in millions 
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TABLE 5.3 
CITY SIZE AND HUSBAND-WIFE WAGE RATIO 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Wh/W .. l 
T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
!N = 16,432! 
( 1 ) (2) 
--------- ---- ------ --------------------------------------------------------
.354 ( 8. 24 ) .426 ( 23. 3) 
.0456 ( 15. 42) 
* * * 
-.0530 (-15.92) 
* * * 
* * * 
. 0 493 ( 17.28) 
.0279 ( 8. 51) 
* * * 
-.0056 (- 1.65 ) 
* * * 
* * * 
.0071 (5. 35) 
-.0004 ( -6. 96 ) 
* * * 
.0 0007 ( 1. 02) 
* * * 
* * * 
-.00 0 1 (-2.45) 
-.0206 ( -9. 31) - .0184 (-8.32) 
.0198 ( 4. 21) .0462 (11.67l 
. R2 .0 38 .0 30 
----------------------- -- ------------ ------------- ----- --------------
HEDUC=husband ' s education 
WEDUC=wife ' s education 
HEXP=husband ' s experience 
WEXP=wife ' s e xperience 
SMSA=SMS A population in millions 
FERT=number of children ever born to wife 
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TABLE 5.4 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND CITY SIZE: 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Status 
(N = 36, 097) 
Variable Coefficient 
INTERCEPT 0 . 398 
EDUCATION 0.091 
EXPERIEN CE - 0 .015 
FERTILITY -(1. 084 
MARITAL -0.799 
SMSA - 0.005 
Note: Labor Force Status = 1 if in labor force ; 
MARITAL = 1 if married spouse present; 
SMSA = SMS A population in ~illions. 
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Asymptotic 
T- Statistics 
5. 0 
2 (1, 1 
-1 7. 1 
-12.2 
-15.6 
-1.3 
TABLE 5.5 
THE URBANIZATION DEFLATOR OF "SEX DISCRIMINATION" AND THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF THE POPULATION BY SM SA POPULATION 
SELECTED YEARS: 1950-1980 
PER CENT OF TOTAL POPU LATION 
1950 1960 19 70 1980 
PROJECTED DECREASE IN 
DISCRIMINATION 
COEFFICIENT 
DEFLATOR" 
-------- ---- -- --- -------- -- -- ------ ------- ---- ---- --- --- -------- --- ------ --
6. 3 5.3 7.9 6.8 0 
4.2 6.8 3. 0 2.7 .063 
9.0 4.6 4.6 4. 1 .034 
0.0 0.0 3 .0 2.9 . 027 
4.4 7.6 7 . 2 9. 3 .030 
5.4 10. 0 14. 0 15.9 .04 3 
8.2 10. 7 10 .8 12. 9 . 059 
9.6 8.8 9.7 10 .6 . 070 
7.6 8. 1 7.4 9.6 . 077 
1.1 1. 0 1. 0 • 9 .079 
-SI'1SA** 44. 2 37. 0 31.4 24. 1 . 081 
100 100 100 100 
ATOR 6.4 3 6.23 5.84 5. 71 
------- ----- ----------- -- ------- --- ----------- -- --------------- ---------- -
The projected decrease i n the se x coefficient (discrimination coefficient ) 
en the ent i re population of the United States is hypothesi z ed to reside in a 
ity the si ze of New Yor k is calculated in the following way. First, using 
he coefficients of the SMSA variable in Colu~n 2, Table 5.1 and the Midpoint 
or each population - interval, the actual deflator of the discriMination 
oefficient i s calculated for each population category. The smaller the size 
fa city, th e sfflaller the deflator, thus the larger the discri•ination 
fficient. For New Yor k , the actual deflator of the discrimination 
is . 081 <. 005*8.5 2 - . 033 *8.5 1 . The projected change in the se x 
oefficient when the entire population of each city - size group mo ve s to a cit y 
e size of New Yor k is obtained by subtracting the actual deflator for each 
ity size categ ory from . 081. 
non - SMS A catego ry , a population of 1,000 was assigned for the the 
calculation. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. Clark, Kahn, and Ofek (1988) also found that the wage 
level of a sample of white males drawn from the CPS data set 
was highest at a city size in the range of 4 to 5 million. 
2. Suppose that husbands of working women have a higher 
reservation wage when considering job openings from employers 
in a distant area. The reservation wage will be greater then 
when an opening is in a smaller city and when a wife's market 
oriented productivity is high. Thus husbands of women with 
higher market productivity are less likely to move to small 
city for they expect larger indirect costs in terms of the 
foregone earnings of their wives. On the other hand, 
husbands, whose market-oriented experience substantially 
exceeds that of their wives and whose earnings are 
substantially more to begin with, are more likely to decide 
to migrate to small city if such a move enhances their own 
income. This tends to further widen the wage gap between 
them and their wives. Similarly, Therefore, one is more 
likely to observe a wider market productivity gap between a 
husband and wife in a small city. Whether a couple decides 
to locate in a small citylargely depends on the couple's 
characteristics. Thus the characteristics of couples living 
in a small city might be different from those of couples in a 
large city; a small market tends to attract families in which 
the husband ' s market productivity far exceeds his wife's. 
Theses effects can be captured more accurately by using the 
within-family data of two-earners couples. 
3. Heckman [1979] treats the sample selection bias as a 
specification error and presents a consistent estimation 
method which involves the estimation of a selection equation 
with a probit function. 
4. Clark, Kahn, and Ofek (1988} employed the same technique 
to calculate GNP deflators. 
5. If we instead use the results from the linear 
specification to calculate the discrimination coefficient 
deflators, the figure is slightly larger: about 13 percent of 
the residual wage gap then can be explained by city size. 
However, the quadratic specification is intuitively more 
appealing, because the most dramatic jump in wages with 
respect to city size is expected to occur in the range of 
smaller cities. In other words, a migration from Binghamton 
to New York is likely produce a greater increa5e in wages per 
million increment in population than a migration from Chicago 
to New York. This difference in the slope of the wage curve 
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over the range of city sizes is captured only by the 
quadratic specification. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RATE OF RETURN TO EDUCATION AND CITY SIZE1 
A TEST OF OVERQUALIFICATION 
In Section 2.4.1, we asserted that the effect of 
overqualification should be greater for women with more 
specific human capital. Thus the directly testable 
implication is that the positive impact of city size on wage 
levels should be larger for more productive women (presumably 
with more specific human capital investments.) 
One way to carry out this test is to compare the 
magnitudes of the rate of return to human capital for women 
in large and small cities. With the traditional earnings 
function, one can estimate the rates of return to educational 
attainment and level of work experience. Of these two, the 
education variable is the better one to employ for examining 
averqualification. Not only is it more straightforward to 
measure, but the education variable is also conceptually more 
relevant than the experience variable to the 
averqualification problem. In a way, overqualification 
results from ignorance about future employment and location. 
Jab investment tends to be made while an individual has 
relatively more information and foresight with respect to her 
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actual job (or occupation) and the specific local labor 
market; it may be less susceptable to overqualification. Put 
differently, job investment is more likely to be custom-made 
and thus less likely to be wasted. However, schooling 
investments tend to be made earlier in life, when an 
individual has less certainty about her actual job as well as 
the location of the geographic labor market. There is more 
room for wasting some of the investment. Schooling 
investment, therefore, might be more sensitive to the 
overqualification problem and is a better variable to employ 
for the testing of overqualification. 
The following function was fitted to the subsample of 
women to test the overqualification hypothesis. 
(6.1) Ln w = f <X, E, M, EM> 
where X denotes individual attributes, E education level, M 
market size, and EM the interaction term of the last two. 
The coefficient of E measures the rate of return to 
education. By examining the coefficient of EM, we can infer 
the impact of city size on the rate of return to education. 
The overqualification theory predicts that the coefficient of 
EM is positive. But as shown in Table 6.1, the coefficient 
of the interaction term is not correctly signed and not 
significant. The result does not conform to the 
overqualification hypothesis. 
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In o~de~ to co~~obo~ate this ~esult, an alte~native 
specification can be applied to the sample of ma~~ied women. 
(6.2) 
Wh, husband's wage, is used as an alte~native measu~e of the 
wife's ma~ket p~oductivity based on its positive co~~elation 
to wife's wage. 
If ove~qualification is a facto~ in the wage supp~ession 
of locationally tied wives in small city, then p~oductive 
women (p~esumably with mo~e specific human capital 
investments) should gain mo~e than less p~oductive women by 
residing in a la~ge labo~ ma~ket. Thus the wages of wives of 
high-wage men should be mo~e sensitive to city size. But the 
reg~ession ~esult p~esented in Table 6.2 indicates that the 
positive impact of city size is smalle~ fa~ mo~e p~oductive 
than fo~ less p~oductive women. Fa~ example, a woman whose 
husband's hou~ly wage is one della~ would have a 3.2 pe~cent 
inc~ease in he~ wage pe~ one million increment in city size. 
But if the husband ' s wage is 2.5 times the mean log of male 
wages (the sample mean is 2.08), the wife's wage is ha~dly 
affected at all (.032- .006 * 2.5 * 2.08 = O>. Thus the 
highe~ the wife's p~oductivity, as measu~ed by he~ husband's 
wage, the smalle~ the impact of city size on he~ wage. This 
result cont~adicts the p~edictions of the ove~qualification 
theo~y.1 
64 
TABLE 6.1 
SMSA SIZE AND THE RATE OF RETURN TO EDUCATION OF WOMEN 
Variable 
INTERCEPT 
EDUC 
EXP 
EXP 2 
SMSA 
EDUC*SMSA 
MS 
FERT 
ADJ. R:z 
Dependent Variable: Ln Wage 
T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
<N =21 ,631 > 
Intercept 
.522 (17.4) 
.068 (34.3) 
.022 (18.5) 
-.0003 <-12.4) 
.025 (3. 7> 
-.001 (-.29) 
-.066 (-5.5) 
-.027 (-9.8) 
.115 
Key: WAGE=yearly earnings/(weeks worked*hours worked) 
EDUC=years of schooling completed 
EXP=age-EDUC-6 
FERT=number of children ever born 
SMSA=SMSA population in millions 
MS=1 for married, 0 for never married 
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TABLE 6.2 
WAGE DETERMINATION OF MARRIED WOMEN: 
CITY SIZE AND HUSBAND'S WAGE 
Dependent Va~iable: Ln Wage 
T- Statistics in Pa~enthesis 
<N = 16,432> 
Variable Coefficient 
Inte~cept 
HEDUC 
WEDUC 
HEXP 
WEXP 
HEXP2 
WEXP 2 
SMSA 
Ln HWAGE 
SMSA*Ln HWAGE 
FERT 
Adj. R:z 
Key: HEDUC=husband ' s education 
WEDUC=wife ' s education 
HEXP=husband ' s experience 
WEXP=wife ' s experience 
SMSA=SMSA population in millions 
FERT=number of children ever born 
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.297 (7. 3 ) 
.0003 (0. 1) 
.063 (25.6) 
-.007 <-2.7) 
.018 (7.0) 
.0002 ( 3 . 3) 
-.0003 <-5.5) 
.032 (6.4) 
.154 <11. 0) 
-.006 ( - 2.7) 
-.024 (-6.8) 
.112 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. Frank [1978] interprets the higher rate of return to city 
size for women solely as manifestation of overqualification. 
Dividing the sample of professional men and women from the 
Survey of Economic Opportunities into five city size 
categories, he found that female wages were 7 percent more 
sensitive than male wages to city size. But he does not 
consider the possibilty of other factors that might be also 
related to city size, such as monopsony. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CITY SIZE EFFECTS FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS: 
EXAMPLES OF MONOPSONY 
Chapter 5 provided strong evidence of wage suppression of 
women induced by the locational tie. However, the empirical 
findings of Chapter 6 did not lend full support to the 
overqualification hypothesis. Exploring alternative 
hypotheses is therefore in order. 
Among the possible explanations of the locational tie 
effect, the main alternative to overqualification is 
monopsony. A test of monopsony can be obtained by estimating 
the differential city size effects on the wages of men and 
women by occupational groups. By doing so, we can 
automatically eliminate the overqualification possibility at 
least in its inter-occupational manifestation. However, the 
occupations selected for this purpose should be those 
requiring a high level of specialized training, in order to 
reduce the possibiltiy of mobility across occupational lines. 
Another point we should be aware of is the possibilty of 
intra-occupational overqualification. We cannot control this 
by grouping samples by occupation as defined in the data. 
For example, an operating room nurse may be overqualified if 
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she has to work as a general pediatric nurse. However, if 
the loss induced by inter-occupation overqualification is a 
more serious problem than intra-occuaptional 
overqualification, then the city size effects from within-
occupation data may be an adequate measure of the extent of 
monopsony. 
Since the census data identifies the occupations of 
individuals we can employ the same estimation method use in 
previous chapters using within-occupation data. 
From the three monopsony models presented in Chapter 3, 
testable implications for each category are derived and 
summarized in Table 7.1. 
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TABLE 7.1 
EXPECTED SIGNS FOR THE THREE CATEGORIES OF MONOPSONISTS 
Monopsonist 
for 
Segregated 
Occupations 
Monopsonist for Mixed Occupations 
Non-discriminating Discriminating 
b3 > 0 
Note: The coefficients correspond to the following estimation 
specification. 
where X = human capital variables 
5 = sex 
M = market size as measured by SMSA population 
The common effect of city size on the wages of men and women 
<b3) is expected to be positive for non-discriminating mixed 
occupations, since both men and women are equally subject to 
monopsony. But for the other two types of occupations, it is 
not clearly predictable. The net additional effect of city 
size on women's wages (b~> is not predictable for the non-
discriminating monopsonist, for gender plays no clear role in 
determining the degree of market competition; but it is 
expected to be positive for monopsonists for segregated 
occupations and discriminating monopsonists for mixed 
occupations. In any case, for all three types of 
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monopsonists, the total effect of city size on the wages of 
women (b3 + b4) is expected to be positive. 
To test the implications tabulated in Table 7.1, several 
occupations are selected. The occupations had to be limited 
to those that provided a large enough sample and that 
required a relatively high level of specialized training. 
For individuals in occupations that require less specialized 
training may have many potential employers, even in a very 
small city, violating a necessary condition for monopsony. 
As representative occupations for segregated occupations, 
nurses, engineers, physicians, policemen, and firefighters 
were selected. These are male segregated occupations except 
for nurses. Unfortunately, there are no other female-
segregated occupations which require a high level of 
specialized training and still provide a large enough sample. 
For mixed occupations, postsecondary teachers, public school 
teachers, natural scientists, computer equipment operators, 
and social scientists were selected. In the following 
sections, we will discuss the empirical results obtained from 
the within-occupation data. 
7.1 Segregated Occupations 
The regression results for the dominating sex in 
segregated occupations are reproduced in Table 7.2. 1 
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Except for physicians, all occupations have positive 
coeffecients of the city size variable. But as predicted by 
equation (3.6>, the magnitude of the city size coefficient is 
greater for nurses, the female-segregated occupation, than 
for the three male-segregated occupations. Nurses· wages 
increase by 5.4 percent for each increment of one million in 
city size. For the same increment of city size, the wages of 
police and firefighters increase 3.1 and 3.7 percent 
respectively for each increment of one million in city size. 
The relatively large size of the coefficents of these two 
occupations may be related to their high level of 
unionization. Since the unionization rate generally increase 
with city size, the city size coeffecient may overestimate 
the the true city size effect. However, the fact that the 
nurses ' coeffeicient is much larger than the coefficients of 
police and firefighters, even with the possiblity of 
overestimation, adds additional strength to this test of the 
monopsony model for segregated occupations. 
The wages of engineers, perhaps the most comparable male-
segregated occupation -- in terms of the required education 
and training level -- increase only by 1 percent for each 
increment of one million in city size. This result is 
consistent with the prediction of the monopsony model for 
segregated occupations. 
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7.2 Mixed Occupations 
Five occupations were selected as representing mixed 
occupations: public school teachers, postsecondary school 
teachers, natural scientists, computer equipment operators, 
and social scientists. A common feature all these 
occupations share is a fairly mixed male-female structure of 
employment. (The proportion of females in these occupations 
ranges from 26 to 72 percent.> The estimation results for 
the five within-occupation data are tabulated in Table 7.3. 
The data for public school teachers exhibit negligible sex-
differentials in wages. But the data for the other four 
occupations demonstrate substantial wage differentials 
between the sexes, ranging from 15 percent to 44 percent. 
Considering that the sex coefficient is estimated controlling 
for human capital, fertility, marital status, and occupation, 
the size of the "discrimination coefficient" for these 
occupations is surprisingly large. We will test the 
discriminating monopsony model against the data for these 
four occupations. 
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7.2.1 Examples of Discriminating Monopsony: Postsecondary 
Teachers, Natural Scientists,Social Scientists, and 
Computer Equipment Operators 
Although the census data for postsecondary teachers show a 
relatively low and insignificant "discrimination 
coefficient", data from other sources indicate that there are 
substantial salary differentials between the sexes for 
postsecondary teachers. 2 The most notable result is obtained 
from this group. Although city size effect on male wages is 
positive, it is not significant. The city size effect on 
female wages, however, amounts to 4 percent per million 
increase in city size and is significant. Taken at face 
value, the strength of the locational tie associated with 
women academics is high and colleges located in small towns 
may exploit the situation. Also, it is interesting to note 
that the market for male academics is quite global; the 
salaries of male faculty do not exhibit a significant 
fluctuation across the range of city sizes. 
Academic salaries, perhaps except for teachers who are 
just starting, are often determined on an individual-by-
individual basis rather than by structured pay schedules. A 
married woman faculty member with a strong local tie in a 
small town is not likely to be a hard bargainer in a pay 
negotiation. For there may be no other college in the area 
which would hire anyone in her discipline. The way academic 
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salaries are determined may allow enough room for the college 
to discriminate against married women faculty members in 
setting their salary level. 
The results from the data for natural scientists, computer 
equipment operators, and social scientists are remarkably 
similar. All three occupations demonstrate negative but 
negligible insignificant city size coeffcients for males, and 
positive, substantial ones with higher t-values for females. 
Since these occupations require fairly high levels of skill 
and specialization <which rule out overqualification>, we can 
argue that these results more or less conform to the 
predictions of discriminating monopsony model for mixed 
occupations. 
7.2.2 Public School Teachers: A Case of Non-Discriminating 
Monopsony 
The data for public school teachers indicate no 
significant sex differentials in wages. In fact, public 
school teachers are the only group that meets the standard of 
a non-discriminating occuaption <with high skill level> and 
that has a large enough number of observations. 
However, between male and female teachers, the difference 
in the effects of city size on wages is quite substantial. 
As shown in Table 7.3, female teachers will gain only a 1.2 
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percent increase in wages for each increment of one million 
in city size. But male teachers will gain a 4.7 percent 
increase in wages for the same increment in city size. The 
large size of the male coefficient may be attributable to 
unobserved factors that are positively related to city size. 3 
The direct way to test the non-discriminating monopsonist 
model is to see whether the impact on wages of the proportion 
of females in an occupation is affected by city size. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the proportion of females in an 
occupation is directly related with the probability of non-
discriminating monopsony. Thus one can predict that the 
higher the proportion of females in an occupation, the more 
positively sensitive the wages in the occupation to city 
size. Unfortunately, we cannot test this implication 
directly, since there are not enough mixed occupations that 
have the same wage levels for both men and women. 
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TABLE 7.2 
MONOPSONY TESTS FOR SEGREGATED OCCUPATIONS 
DIFFERENTIAL CITY SIZE EFFECTS: 
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
Occupations N 
Female 
Nurse 970 
Physicians* 312 
Police & 
Detectives 393 
Firefighting & 
Prevention 161 
Engineers 1217 
Mean 
Wage 
8.14 
20.66 
9.34 
7.67 
12. 19 
Dependent Variable: Hourly wage 
Mean 
EDUC 
14.9 
19.8 
13.4 
12.6 
15.6 
SMSA 
Coefficients 
.054 (1.8) 
-.007 (-.4) 
• 031 (3. 9) 
• 037 (3. 1) 
.011 (2.2) 
Control variables: EDUC, EXP, EXP 2 , MS, FERT (for nurses) 
* Include self-employed. 
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TABLE 7.3 
MONOPSONY TESTS FOR MIXED OCCUPATIONS 
SEX-DIFFERENTIALS OF CITY SIZE EFFECTS ON WAGES: 
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
Occupation 
Discriminating 
Postsecondary 
Teachers 
Natural 
Scientists 
Computer 
Equipment 
Operators 
Social 
Scientists 
'/. 
Female 
37 
26 
57 
33 
Non-Discriminating 
Public School 
Teachers 
72 
N 
461 
234 
279 
166 
1622 
T-statistics in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: Hourly wage 
Mean 
Wage 
11.54 
10.86 
7.28 
11. 1 
11. 46 
SEX 
-.153 
(-. 1 ) 
-.284 
(-I. 9) 
-.435 
( -3. 8) 
-. 156 
i-. 8) 
- . 009 
(-. 1) 
Control Variables: EDUC, EXP, EXP 2 1 MS, NS*SEX, FERT 
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SHSA 
.014 
(. 96) 
- . 006 
(-. 3) 
- . 006 
(- . 4) 
-.005 
(-. 2) 
.047 
( 4. 4) 
. 040 
(I. 8) 
.0 37 
(I. 2) 
.0 21 
(I. 0) 
. 041 
( 1 . 3) 
-.035 
(-2.8) 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1. Since there were too few members of the minority 5ex in 
the data for segregated occupations to use as a sample 9 the 
members of the minority sex were deleted from the sample. 
2. According to the National Science Foundation Register 9 
although the starting salaries of men and women with Ph.Ds 
are nearly equal 9 the salary differential increases with 
years of experience in all disciplines. For further analysis 
of sex differentials in the academic job market 9 see Johnson 
and Stafford [1975]. 
3. Also 9 it is widely known that moonlighting and summer 
employment are quite prevalent among teachers. The census 
data does not identify the income from moonlighting and 
seasonal employment separately. Therefore 9 if the following 
conditions are met 9 we should suspect that the estimate is 
biasd: <1> wages from the moonlighting and the summer 
employment are higher than from teaching 9 <2> male teachers 
practice moonlighting and summer employment more heavily 9 (3) 
moonlighting and summer employment opportunities for teachers 
increase with city size. If all three conditions are met 9 
then the city size effect for male teachers must be overestimated. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
The empirical findings from the 1980 Census 1/1000 sample 
indicate that the wage gap between married men and women 
decreases with city size. The computation based on 
regression results shows that about 12 percent of the 
unexplained wage gap between married men and women may be 
accounted for by city size. However, the wage-gap between 
single men and women does not seem to have a significant 
relationship with city size. These results are consistent 
with the main implications derived from the hypothesis of a 
locational tie associated with married women. To the extent 
that wives have less market human capital than their 
husbands, married women may be forced to optimize their 
employment mainly in the local labor market, unlike their 
husbands who are more likely to optimize their employment in 
the national labor market. Given such circumstances, married 
women ' s wages will be more sensitive to city size than those 
of men or single women. For as locationally tied 
individuals, they are likely to suffer more--in terms of 
lower wages--in a small city than in a large city. 
This study presented two hypotheses of how the locational 
tie operates through specific market mechasnisms to suppress 
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the wages of affected individuals in a small city: <1> 
overqualification and (2) employer monopsony. Since the 
empirical results did not render full support to the 
overqualification theory, employer monopsony, as one 
alternative hypothesis, was more closely examined. 
If our interpretation of the empirical findings is 
correct, then two predictions can be made: 
(1) The wage gap between men and women arising from the 
relative geographic immobility of married women may be 
slightly reduced if urbanization trends continue, since women 
will increasingly find themselves located in more competitive 
local labor markets. 
(2) The wage gap caused by the differential mobility of 
married men and women is also likely to be reduced as the job 
investment behavior of women increasingly assimilates to that 
of men <perhaps accompanied by a continuing decrease in the 
fertily rate>. For the increased investment of women in 
their market human capital would lower the probability of 
their being tied. 
The present study also reveals the relevance of the 
monopsony model to labor market studies for married women. 
Employer monopsony, often regarded as a short-run condition, 
has generally received little attention, perhaps because 
labor is generally assumed to be mobile in the long-run. 
However, as a result of the family utility-maximization 
process, married women are likely to remain relatively 
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immobile even in the long-run. Thus for married women, 
employer monopsony may not be a transient phenomenon which 
can be eventually corrected over time. This may be the 
reason behind the evidence of monopsony found earlier from 
the data of registered nurses and public school teachers, 
both occupations being predominantly female. 
If such monopsony exclusively affects the wages of married 
women in a small labor market, then the usual estimation of 
sex-discrimination coefficients, unadjusted for this factor, 
will tend to overestimate the actual extent of sex 
discrimination. 
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